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Is corporate social responsibility anything more 
than a mask for multinational (oil) companies? 
 






In this chapter we address a certain problematic use of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). After first stopping at various CSR definitions, we 
ask ourselves what kind of responsibility CSR really is? We continue by 
pointing out its contested rationale and ask ourselves whether CSR is le-
gitimate and ought to be desirable? Within this debate, we discuss the prop-
osition that CSR can be tolerated only in the case when it is employed as a 
veil for increasing the corporation’s profits. One such use is the case when 
a corporation employs CSR as a tool for creating a fake façade or a mask 
over its unethical, illegal or criminal conduct. Bearing such cases in mind, 
some scholars (cf. Bakan, 2004; Babiak and Hare, 2007) have suggested 
the analogy between a (deviant) corporation and a human psychopath. We 
present this analogy in some detail and show various examples of using 
CSR as a mask by some multinational oil corporations. In conclusion, we 
answer the question posed in the title. 
  
                                                          
1  Matjaž Jager is a Senior researcher and Director of the Institute of Criminology 
at the Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana. Dr. Ciril Keršmanc is a judge 
at the District court in Ljubljana. Katja Šugman Stubbs is a judge at the Con-
stitutional court of the Republic of Slovenia, Professor of law at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Ljubljana and a Senior researcher at the Institute of Crimi-
nology at the Faculty of Law Ljubljana. The authors wish to acknowledge the 




Organisational choices in relation to the law 
 
Looked at from the binary and sometimes simplified, legalistic (“either le-
gal or illegal”) perspective, the main choices of a corporation as a subject 
of the law are rather simple: 1) it can either comply or 2) not comply with 
the law.2 Needless to add, these two options or perhaps better – short or 
long terms attitudes – are in most cases not fixed once and for all; they may 
be shifting in time and may be partially or selectively applied. We also 
know that some smart corporations try to influence the substance of the 
law in their favour beforehand, thus avoiding being tempted by the risky 
second option. But for our purpose here we are principally interested in a 
third choice they may also make; they may voluntarily go beyond the du-
ties of the law. This is, in fact, a kind of a proverbial additional effort of 
‘going an extra mile’. And, legally speaking, this is the main idea of cor-
porate social responsibility. It starts where the legal obligation ends. For 
some reason, corporations decide to take additional obligations in favour 
of, for example, their employees, customers and/or the society at large, as 
in the case of environmental protection measures. Legally speaking these 
obligations, as a rule, cannot be legally enforced by the beneficiaries and 
thus fall within the so-called ‘soft law’. This said, it is also clear that the 
formal notion of going beyond legal obligations does not tell us much about 
the content of this effort.  
 
 
What does corporate social responsibility cover? 
 
A clear definition always goes a long way in securing a rational debate. In 
this respect, it is unfortunate that the concept of CSR does not yet have a 
uniform definition but rather a small sea of them. Zerk for example, in her 
book Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (2006) goes 
through different definitions put forward by the European Commission, the 
United Kingdom government, Canadian-based non-governmental organi-
sation Ethics in Action, CSR Wire, The World Economic Forum and The 
Confederation of British Industries, before she defines CSR as: 
                                                          
2  On the (sub)option of being »legal but not right« or »lawful but awful«, see, 




“the notion that each business enterprise, as a member of society, has a 
responsibility to operate ethically and in accordance with its legal obli-
gations and to strive to minimise any adverse effects of its operations 
and activities on the environment, society, and human health” (Zerk, 
2006: 32). 
 
CSR is also called ‘corporate social performance’, ‘corporate social re-
sponsiveness’, ‘corporate citizenship’ and similar (cf. Carroll, 1999). One 
business dictionary defines it perhaps more adequately broadly as “[a] 
company’s sense of responsibility towards the community and environment 
in which it operates.” Or, one can see CSR as a result of a pressure from 
outside, i.e., as a “requirement placed on an organisation to be accounta-
ble for its impact on all stakeholders” (Okodudu cited in Wosu, 2013: 16). 
In practice CSR may range from classical philanthropy to a much more 
encompassing CSR paradigm of “managing for stakeholders”: customers, 
suppliers, employees, financiers and not least communities (Freeman et al., 
2007). It appears that two motives that may be decisive are either a genuine 
concern for the issues addressed or self-interest.  
 In a globalised world where multinational companies (MNC) operate, 
different states may have different conventional and legal standards. What 
is considered to be illegal and unacceptable in one country, may be legal 
or at least tolerated in another. As a result, what is a mandatory legal re-
quirement outside the scope of voluntary CSR in one country may be above 
and beyond the legal requirements and only considered to be voluntary 
CSR in another. One can see how this mismatch of standards might con-
tribute to a muddled notion of what voluntary CSR might or should in fact 
be. A good example is the flaring of associated gas in oil extraction by 
MNCs, a practice which will be analysed later – alongside others – to il-
lustrate how the CSR may be used to negate and evade the responsibility 
and appear more socially responsible than one in fact is.   
 Because of the lack of a clear and broadly accepted definition, the frag-
mented approach to CSR outlined above is what we have at present. Ex-
pectations simply vary, despite the initiatives to create worldwide CSR 
standards at least in some areas. For example, there is a growing effort to 
establish coordinated standards for human rights abuses by businesses; the 
United Nations put forward the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, while the EU proposed its 2016 Council of Europe 
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Recommendations on human rights and businesses, to name only a few of 
the most general initiatives.  
 
1. But is it legitimate? 
 
Before jumping ahead, we may ask ourselves whether CSR is, in fact, to 
be desired and why? Surprisingly the idea is controversial, at least in the-
ory. The Nobel Prize winner for economics Milton Friedman did not like 
it at all. In his book Capitalism and Freedom, he called CSR a “fundamen-
tally subversive doctrine” unsuitable for a free society (Friedman, 1962: 
133). In his essay “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits” that appeared in The New Your Times magazine in 1970 (Fried-
man, 1970: 126) he made his point clear:  
 
“. . . there is only one and only social responsibility of business – to use 
its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in 
open and free competition without deception or fraud.”  
 
In a nutshell: the wider social goals are not for business leaders but for the 
legislature to decide. In the aftermath, one of the ruling figures of the eco-
nomic analysis of law, Judge Richard Posner, articulated similar concerns 
in his Economic Analysis of Law (1998: 460-463). This understanding of 
what the corporation is all about is based on the so-called “nexus of con-
tracts” view of the corporation which posits the shareholders’ profit maxi-
misation as its sole legitimate goal and sees CSR as a step in the opposite 
direction (cf. Avi-Yonah, 2006: 3-5). 
 This position on the legitimacy of CSR did raise some academic debate. 
It became obvious that one’s position on CSR depends on one’s view of 
the underlying theory of the purpose of the corporation. Thus, Friedman’s 
negative position on CSR is a logical implication of the view that the sole 
obligation of the management is to deliver the highest possible profits to 
the shareholders. Interestingly, however, the interventions of Friedman and 
his followers did not, in fact, influence the development in corporate CSR 
practice. Today there is hardly a Fortune 500 corporation that does not is-
sue a kind of a CSR annual report on various issues from environmental 
protection to traditional charity (cf. Spence, 2011: 61).   
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 Hence, CSR is today a widely accepted form of (international) business 
practice. The idea that started as voluntary internal organisational policy or 
strategy at the level of individual corporations is witnessing a shift towards 
wider, more coordinated schemes, standards and soft law recommenda-
tions at regional, national and transnational levels (the UN, the EU, etc.).  
 Interestingly, however, the only instance where Milton Friedman would 
reluctantly tolerate CSR is when it is not used as an “end in itself”. In other 
words, he would tolerate it when it is used as a means to increase profits, 
even though that does not change the fact that it is still a “hypocritical win-
dow dressing”, i.e. a little bit of a deception, that someone could “disdain 
as approaching fraud” (Friedman, 1970: 125). As Bakan summarised 
Friedman’s point: “The executive who treats social and environmental val-
ues as a means to maximise shareholders’ wealth – not as ends in them-
selves – commits no wrong. It is like ‘putting a good-looking girl in front 
of an automobile to sell an automobile’”. This is indeed “hypocritical win-
dow dressing” but serves the bottom line (Bakan, 2005: 34). In other 
words, CSR may only be used as an instrument of increasing the profita-
bility of a business, be it short, mid or long term. In fact, in this respect, it 
becomes something internal and not external to the business strategy of the 
corporation as its integral and valuable “profit hub”. 
 Therefore, it looks like the law-abiding corporation faces the following 
options regarding CSR:  
a) not to use CSR at all and proceed with business-as-usual; 
b) make CSR part of a business plan and by its effort try to increase profit 
even more than in case (a); and finally,  
c) deliberately employ CSR for intrinsic reasons while taking into account 
that the profits could (but need not) be lower than without CSR effort.  
 
The division between option b) and c) may not be strict at all. The corpo-
ration may believe in intrinsic reasons for CSR and still think this is the 
best for profit and stability in particular in the long run (a kind of intrinsic 




2. Another possible combination  
 
So far, we have assumed that the corporation stays within the limits of 
(hard) law of the land. But this is not always the case. Even in the case 
when the corporation decides to break the law it must/may still decide 
among the same three options concerning the CSR that we outlined above 
(i.e. do nothing, CSR as part of a business plan, or intrinsic CSR). 
 We are interested in one variation of the second option; a deviant cor-
poration with a CSR mask. This combination may not be so uncommon. 
For example, the corporation fails to comply with hard and/or self-imposed 
soft law and at the same time continues to use CSR tools as a deliberate 
deception or a mask to hide its (primary) deviance. It would be like pre-
tending to go an extra mile without even finishing the required primary 
distance. A good example would be Enron. We may read in the literature 
that the notorious Enron Corporation had a special CSR task force with a 
substantial number of employees. It won many awards for its CSR efforts, 
including a Climate Protection Award, and a ‘Corporate Conscience 
Award’. Despite the image of a high ‘corporate conscience’ and a good 
‘corporate citizenship’ that they carefully produced and maintained, its 
main business activities turned out to have disastrous and criminal conse-
quences on many levels, including environmental protection. One of the 
main protagonists, Enron’s president Jeff Skilling, could not have de-
scribed it better when he clarified to one of his energy department execu-
tives: “Mike . . . we are a green energy company, but the green stands for 
money” (cit. in Bradley, 2009: 309-310, cf. Bakan, 2005: 57-58).  
 Consequently, we can expand our classification even further. There are 
two types of using CSR as a ‘hypocritical window dressing’, i.e. as a mask: 
(1) by a law-abiding corporation to appear compassionate and concerned 
(in order to increase profits) and (2) by a law-breaking corporation to ap-
pear compassionate and concerned (in order to increase profits or deflect 
law enforcement attention). In both cases, we assume profit maximisation 
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as the final goal.3 The second type employs CSR mostly as a kind of a PR, 
cover up or a pre-emptive damage control activity.  
 This brings us to the analogy that we want to explore further. Using 
CSR as a deception in order to hide unethical, illegal or even criminal ac-
tivities may signal certain corporate “character traits”. Joel Bakan pointed 
this out in his renowned work The Corporation (2005). He asked himself 
whether a parallel between deviant modern multinational corporations and 
human psychopaths is possible. It appeared to him that:  
 
“Human psychopaths are notorious for their ability to use charm as a 
mask to hide their dangerously self-obsessed personalities. For corpo-
rations, social responsibility may play the same role. Through it, they 
can present themselves as compassionate and concerned about others 
when, in fact, they lack the ability to care about anyone or anything but 
themselves” (Bakan, 2005: 57). 
 
He decided to present this question to one of the highest authorities on the 
issue of human psychopathy – Robert D. Hare – a researcher renowned in 
the field of criminal psychology, who in the 1970s developed a diagnostic 
tool called the psychopathy checklist (PCL). He asked him to apply the test 
to corporations in general. Hare observed numerous similarities, summa-
rized by Bakan as follows: “The corporation is irresponsible, Dr. Hare 
said, because “in an attempt to satisfy the corporate goal, everybody else 
is put at risk.” Corporations try to “manipulate everything, including 
public opinion”, and they are grandiose, always insisting that we’re 
number one, we’re the best.”A lack of empathy and asocial tendencies 
are also key characteristics of the corporation, says Hare – “their behav-
iour indicates they don’t really concern themselves with their victims”; 
and corporations often “refuse to accept responsibility for their own ac-
tions and are unable to feel remorse: if [corporations] get caught [breaking 
the law], they pay big fines and they . . . continue doing what they did before 
anyway.” And in fact, in many cases, the fines and the penalties paid by 
                                                          
3  The financial profitability of CSR for the corporation has been assessed em-
pirically. Conclusions are not unanimous; early studies reported positive, neg-
ative and neutral financial impact. A meta-study published in 2003 concluded 
that CSR actually pays off (Orlitzky, Schmidt, Rynes, 2003). 
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the organisation are trivial compared to the profits that they rake in. Finally, 
according to Dr. Hare, corporations relate to others superficially – “their 
whole goal is to present themselves to the public in a way that is appealing 
to the public [but] in fact may not be representative of what th[e] organi-
sation is really like” (Bakan, 2005: 57). After going through the entire PCL 
checklist in this manner, the conclusion he was able to make was the fol-
lowing:    
 
“. . . it would be pretty hard for us not to look at the corporate structure 
itself as not being psychopathic. They would have all the 
characteristics. And in fact, I suppose one could argue that in many 
respects a corporation of that sort is of the prototypical psychopath, at 
the corporate level instead of the individual level” (Bakan, 2005: 56-
57).4 
 
In other words, Hare agreed with Bakan that the analogy could be 
meaningful. Superficial, grandiose, manipulative, irresponsible, impulsive, 
striving for short-term goals, asocial, without empathy or remorse and 
without the ability to accept responsibility – these are the traits that a 
modern corporation and a psychopath have in common. The only symptom 
on his PCL that Hare was not able to identify was poor behavioural control, 




Some examples of CSR (mis)use by multinational oil 
companies 
 
Undoubtedly, some of the accidents in the oil industry are results of the 
nature and intrinsic danger of this activity.5 On the other hand, oil and gas 
                                                          
4  Dr. Hare was also included in the documentary based on and named the same 
as Bakan's book, The Corporation. 
5  The Exxon Valdez oil accident, in the aftermath of which 11 million gallons 
of crude oil spilled and polluted 1.932 kilometer of Alaska’s Prince William 
Sound coastline in 1989, did involve reckless action, but as the US Supreme 
Court found in Exxon Shipping et al. v. Grant Baker et al. “it was without 
intentional or malicious conduct, and without behaviour driven primarily by 
desire for gain” (para.40). In this case, the US Supreme Court recognised that 
not all accidents can be treated equally and capped punitive damages in cases 
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MNCs are repeatedly mentioned in connection to intentional labour and 
human rights law violations, not to mention the environmental pollution. 
They typically function in a trans-border, multi-jurisdictional business 
environment, many times involving developing countries with an 
ineffective legal system in place. But, even if their legal obligations are 
muddled or not enforced effectively, they still have CSR tools at their 
disposal. 
 On a generic level, codes of conduct, principles, guidelines/standards 
(including management and reporting systems), benchmarks, networks and 
multi-partner organisations, awards, to name but a few, are all considered 
to be voluntary CSR tools. Multinational oil companies have at their dis-
posal all of the CSR tools intended for general use (such as for example 
the United Nations Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, AA1000 Assurance 
Standard, etc.)6 as well as those put in place specifically for extractive in-
dustries (such as for example Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), Publish What You Pay (PWYP) and Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
(GGFR).7  
 These tools can also be used as a mask, but to get the better picture one 
should look at it in greater detail. At the same time we may also try to 
identify some of the ‘psychopathic’ traits mentioned by Hare. Some MNC 
were accused of complicity in grave human rights violations, such as 
forced labour, rape, and murder in the case of the Unocal gas pipeline con-
struction in Myanmar8 or alleged killings in Nigeria in the Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.9 and Bowoto v. Chevron10 cases. In addition, multi-
                                                          
of reckless action profitless for the tortfeasor to 1:1 in relation to compensatory 
damages, consequently reducing punitive damages from $ 2.5 billion to $ 500 
million. 
6  See  http://www.unglobalcompact.org/, http://www.globalreport-
ing.org/Home, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/, http://www.accountabil-
ity21.net/  
7  See  http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/,  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EX-
TGGFR/  
8  The Doe v. Unocal case was brought before a U.S. court and settled before it 
ended. See Girion (2004) and also Rosencranz and Louk (2005). 
9  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
10  Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2nd 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
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national oil corporations have dubious records in upholding their environ-
mental pledges, despite their going green and promising responsibility to-
wards the environment. Because of this, NGOs frequently accuse corpora-
tions of greenwashing, that is of “unjustified appropriation of environmen-
tal virtue by a company . . . to create a pro-environmental image, sell a 
product or a policy, or to try and rehabilitate their standing with the public 
and decision makers after being embroiled in controversy” (Source Watch 
2010: 55). Similarly the term ‘blue wash’ is used to characterise the abuse 
of goodwill towards the United Nations by those participants of the Global 
Compact that wrap themselves in the flag of the UN, while still violating 
human rights, labour and environmental standards. Many times there is a 
lack of any monitoring or enforcement of standards by the UN itself 
(Kenny and Karliner, 2000: 39). Not surprisingly, multinational oil corpo-
rations figure highly in such indictments (e.g. Solman, 2008; Moreci, 2008; 
Cheeseman, 2008).  
 A particular example is gas flaring in the Niger Delta, which we want 
to look at in greater detail. It occurs when natural gas is released as a con-
sequence of oil production. Since it is unprofitable to collect, it is burnt on 
the site. The near-constant combustion this entails has severely detrimental 
effects on the local environment and people. (cf. Earth Report/BBC, 2010: 
18). In the Niger Delta, in particular, gas flaring has been going on for 
decades with disastrous consequences for the environment and the inhab-
itants of the area.11  
 If one looks at the codes of conduct of Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and 
Exxon/Mobil, which are among the biggest players in Nigerian oil produc-
tion, all are highly committed to protecting the environment12, yet have still 
to curtail or are very slow in curtailing the harmful gas flaring in the Niger 
                                                          
11  Cf. Wosu (2013) for the comprehensive overview of the various forms of 
harmful externalities of oil exploration in the Niger Delta. For a very recent 
overview of the situation see, e.g., Jerič (2018).  
12  For example Royal Dutch Shell in its code of conduct states that it is “commit-
ted to the goal of doing no harm to people and protecting the environment” 
while ”contributing to the communities in which we operate as good neigh-
bours, creating lasting social benefits.” (Royal Dutch Shell, Code of conduct). 
Chevron states: “We place the highest priority on the health and safety of our 
workforce and protection of our assets, communities and the environment” 
(Chevron, The Chevron way). Exxon Mobil conducts its business“. . . in a 
manner that is responsive of the environment and economic needs of the com-
munities in which we operate”. (ExxonMobil, Environmental performance). 
427 
 
Delta oil production. The first legislative acts aimed at reducing gas flaring 
go back as far as 1973, yet without much success. Way back in 1999 the 
Nigerian government and the oil industry operators had agreed to end flar-
ing by 2008 but no substantive improvement has been achieved so far (cf. 
Ukwuoma, 2008). This reluctance or extreme tardiness in tackling gas flar-
ing is symptomatic for the entire oil community in Nigeria. Thus the con-
clusion: “the history of commitment on this issue is that of broken promises, 
ground-shifting, shady deals and ignored legislation.” (ibid.)  
 It is not difficult to see how this description of the oil companies’ con-
duct in Nigeria accords with Hare’s diagnosis of psychopathic behaviour. 
It would, of course, be biased not to take into account the technical and 
practical difficulties involved in diverting associated gas to other uses, 
which is the usual explanation given by the oil corporations. Yet, as the 
Director of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), Chukwueke, 
pointed out: 
 
“The federal government and the oil companies agreed on the zero gas 
flaring date. In fact, it was the oil companies that chose the date. So, 
they do not have any reason for not meeting with the deadline [. . .] The 
zero gas flaring was supposed to be January 1, 2008, but some of them 
in the industry were arguing that it should be December 31, next year, 
now they are also saying we should give them till 2010 [. . .] the industry 
knew the context when it agreed on the 2008 date” (ibid.). 
 
Even today, more than ten years after the agreed upon but many times ex-
tended “deadline”, the situation has not improved substantially. It is there-
fore not so much a case of technical difficulties as one of short-term 
cost/benefit calculation for the multinational oil corporations concerned.13 
There is a price tag on multinational oil corporations’ environmental con-
cern.  
                                                          
13  This is supported by the following: “According to The Guardian source, the 
oil companies submitted that putting a deadline on gas flare without adequate 
funding arrangements for oil and gas projects would not help the course of the 
government in addressing environmental and economic factors associated with 
gas flaring in the country” (Ukwuoma, 2008). In 2009 the Nigerian senate set 
a new date to end gas flaring – December 2010. With the expiry of this dead-
line, the flaring of gas was supposed to become a criminal offence in Nigeria; 
except, typically, for those who get a special permit of exception from the min-





The main obstacles to accountability 
 
Multinational oil corporations adhere to double or often multiple standards. 
They have to follow one set of rules, usually highly regulated and enforced 
in their home state (or a developed host-state), while they follow “interna-
tional best practices for oil production” in developing host states (Global 
Gas Flaring Reduction). The latter are just “best practices” and any en-
forcement in developing and usually corrupt host state is notoriously diffi-
cult to achieve, as the case of Niger Delta gas flaring illustrates. 
 Separate legal personalities of MNC’s subsidiaries (or contracting part-
ners) in each state where the multinational corporation operates create ju-
risdictional problems which arise as a result of that separation. This pre-
sents obstacles in establishing any kind of accountability on the side of the 
multinational oil corporation as a whole (Zerk, 2006: 104 et seq.). If there 
is a major incident, one grave enough to be reported internationally, the 
consequences for the corporation concerned usually go no further than 
some bad publicity, a temporary reduction in its stock prices or, at worst, 
the liquidation of a subsidiary. Nonetheless, human rights standards14 and 
the emerging international standards of conduct regarding the environ-
ment15 and labour16 may be creating a level of tolerance which, if broken, 
can result in civil and criminal17 liability in the corporation’s home state, 
                                                          
14  See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978); 6 ILM 360 (1967); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S. 
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); 6 ILM 368 (1967). 
15  See the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (31 ILM 874), 
which lists 27 (environmental) principles including the precautionary princi-
ple, the “polluter pays” principle, environmental impact assessment and the 
concept of sustainable development. 
16  See the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 37 
ILM 1233 (1998). 
17 The nationality principle, for example, permits a country to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over any of its nationals accused of criminal offences in another 
state. In Slovenia, for example, there are special substantive criminal law pro-
visions pertaining specifically to juridical persons, meaning that a corporation 
based in Slovenia can be put on trial as a corporation/juridical person and a 
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Emerging solutions /remedies? 
 
As to ‘hard law’ violations – the only ones that can be legally enforced – 
Zerk suggests that  
 
“it is possible that, given time, more general or procedural obligations 
for multinationals could emerge, such as a prohibition on double stand-
ards, an obligation to carry out environmental impact assessments and 
apply a precautionary approach, and an obligation to warn affected em-
ployees, communities and consumers of health, safety, and environ-
mental risks” (Zerk, 2006: 298).  
 
In her book, she examines two possible solutions for regulating multina-
tional corporations, specifically home state regulation and international 
regulation and generally appears to favour (future) international regulation 
(Zerk, 2006: 299-310). However, given the reluctance of states to surrender 
their sovereignty and the time it will take to establish and implement the 
international bodies and adopt mandatory regulation18, home state regula-
tion would seem to be the only choice for the time being.  
 
  
                                                          
conviction can ultimately result in its liquidation. See Zakon o odgovornosti 
pravnih oseb za kazniva dejanja, Ur. l. RS 98/2004, 65/2008 (SLO).  
18  A practical example is well presented by Stephen Kabel (2004: 477-478). He 
describes an unsuccessful process of negotiation to bring legal persons within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The French proposal 
was ultimately withdrawn. The author argues, though, that the jurisdiction over 
legal persons, although not express, is implicitly recognised. See also Šugman 
and Jager (2009) for an EU case study on sovereignty in criminal matters (spe-
cifically regarding environmental protection).  
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1. Tort law 
 
In addition, home state regulation already exists. Zerk identifies four 
groups of theories on parent company liability which can be utilised to es-
tablish accountability in a parent company or subsidiary, once the case is 
accepted by a home state court (Zerk, 2006: 215-233). The amount or lack 
of control exercised by the parent company seems to be the deciding factor 
and it is here that voluntary CSR tools can play a role. Especially initiatives 
to increase transparency (such as GRI) or set operational standards (such 
as ISO 26000 or AA 1000 AS) can make it easier to prove effective control 
in a court of law by leaving behind a clear paper trail and also detailing 
misconduct such as misrepresentation or lack of due care. Therefore, even 
though CSR initiatives are voluntary by nature, they can aid in establish-
ing/proving accountability once they are in place.  
 
2. Criminal law 
 
As for criminal liability and home state prosecution, one needs to distin-
guish two categories, namely, the prosecution of individuals working for 
multinational companies and the prosecution of the parent company as a 
juridical person. The former lies outside the scope of the present chapter, 
while the criminal responsibility of legal persons has gradually been estab-
lished in common law as well as on the continent. Selinšek notes that while 
in most continental European states19 the criminal responsibility of juridi-
cal persons is seen as an accessory to that of the physical person who is 
acting in its name, the evolution, especially of the US law, appears to be 
moving towards accepting the independent and principal responsibility of 
corporations (Selinšek, 2005: 192).  
 Slovenia, for example, has adopted a Criminal Liability of Legal Enti-
ties Act20, which in article 3/3 states that a domestic legal entity is respon-
sible also for a felony committed abroad against a foreign state, citizen or 
legal entity. According to the act, there are five possible sanctions for a 
legal entity found guilty of such a felony, namely:  
                                                          
19 An exception she makes note of is Belgium, where the conviction of a corpora-
tion generally excludes criminal responsibility on the part of the agent acting 
for it unless the agent acts intentionally. See also Faure (1999: 111).  
20  Zakon o odgovornosti pravnih oseb za kazniva dejanja (Criminal Liability of 
Legal Entities Act), Ur. l. RS 98/2004, 65/2008 (SLO). 
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1. a monetary fine;  
2. confiscation of property;  
3. liquidation (with confiscation of property);  
4.  ineligibility for participating in public tenders and  
5. a prohibition from trading with financial instruments (art. 12).  
 
In addition, a conviction may also result in the revocation of issued con-
cessions/licenses and inadmissibility from entering new bids for li-
censes/concessions (art. 21). In the US, a corporation may, for example, be 
found guilty of knowing endangerment and fined under the Federal Water 
pollution Control Act (sec. 309).21 The US also has the so-called charter 
revocation laws and, notably, the notorious multinational oil company Un-
ocal was among the first in the modern age to be threatened with a corpo-
rate death sentence (Mokhiber, 1998).  
 The global nature of multinational corporations adds yet another layer 
of complexity to the debate. As with tort law, there are legal obstacles pre-
venting one from treating a multinational corporation/enterprise as a single 
(accountable) entity. When several separate legal entities in a ‘home’ state 
are involved, the concept of aiding and abetting can sometimes be of help 
(Selinšek, 2005: 209-225). However, given the accessory nature22 of this 
concept, it often fails when different jurisdictions and substantive stand-
ards are involved. If there is no underlying violation by a principal in a 
foreign state due to a different substantive criminal provision there, aiding 
and abetting should theoretically be excluded from further consideration. 
There is a simple solution to the problem, nevertheless. As with the classic 
textbook example of a separate criminal offence of aiding and abetting in 
connection to suicide, the legislative body of the home state can always 
transform aiding and abetting into an independent felony; it can criminalise 
aiding and abetting in connection to a specific crime.   
 As in the case of tort law, we may come to the same conclusion con-
cerning the importance of CSR tools in relation to criminal law responsi-
bility; CSR tools once in place can aid in establishing/proving accounta-
bility.  
                                                          
21  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC 1251 et seq. (US). 
22  By “accessory nature” one should understand the requirement of double crim-
inality, because if the act of the principal (in a host-developing state) is not a 
criminal act, then according to accepted theory, aiding and abetting should not 





Milton Friedman argued that the only legitimate social responsibility of 
business is to increase its profits no matter what, “so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition 
without deception or fraud” (Friedman, 1970: 126). Even if we – for a mo-
ment – remain in this frame of mind, we see that he must have assumed a 
developed, relatively non-corrupt and effective legal system that in princi-
ple punishes businesses practicing ‘deception or fraud’. Yet, in many if not 
most of the developing countries of the world, this is, unfortunately for the 
majority of their citizens, not the case. The government does not do its job 
properly, and some of these countries are wholly or partly ‘failed states”.  
 On top of that some of them may suffer the so-called ‘oil curse’ (cf. 
Collier, 2008), the idea that sometimes petroleum wealth creates more 
harm than good for the oil-rich country. In a highly globalised business of 
oil extraction multinational oil corporations operate in such Third World, 
corrupt, legally underdeveloped and partly or totally failed states. In com-
parison to their home – mostly First World – country, the business environ-
ment of a host country may be more muddled and less concerned about the 
standards of applicable laws and regulations, to say the least. In such a 
situation, Friedman’s “profits at all costs seeking” MNC will delay the im-
plementation of costly environmental improvements as the risk of being 
“effectively, proportionately and dissuasively” sanctioned will be very 
small. Meanwhile, it will try to maintain the green image in order to reduce 
the eventual reputational damage. The case of gas flaring in the Niger Delta 
illustrates how corporations, using CSR as PR, want to appear more so-
cially responsible than they actually are. 
 To conclude – widespread CSR efforts of corporations acknowledge the 
fact that they do not operate in a social void. There are instances of genuine 
ethically driven CSR and CSR initiatives that begin to take into account all 
those that have a stake in activities of a business. But clearly, CSR is also 
much too often misused as a mask, analogous to the way a human psycho-
path uses his charm as a fake façade hiding his self-absorbed personality.  
 Nonetheless, to answer our question in the title of this essay, even in 
these cases, once the CSR tools with their procedures and standards are in 
place, they may leave behind paper trails, which can make it easier to prove 
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illegal misconduct in the court of law either in a tort, administrative or 
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